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Introduction
The idea of non-interference in the domestic affairs of
states has been a hallmark of international relations since
the seventeenth century. The universalisation of the
nation-state model following decolonisation over the
twentieth century rendered this ideal of state sovereignty
the basis of the modem international political system.
States mostly keep out of each other’s business, but
intervention may take the form of war to enforce regime
change.
M ore often interventions in the form o f
peacekeeping operations can occur if sufficient political
will exists within the United Nations system or regional
organisations to end conflict or combat humanitarian
catastrophes. In this regard failed states are an
international concern as the breakdown of a state’s
capacity to control its population and administration may
have severe implications for its neighbours. Challenges
to state authority may result in violence, murder, the
creation of refugee flows, or perhaps increased criminal
activity through transnational crime groups taking hold.
As a supporter of the ‘coalition of the willing’,
A ustralia has played only a bit part in weighty
international events, but as Paul Kelly (2004) has argued,
Australia has long held dear the notion that it is ‘Punching
Above Our Weight’. While an international lightweight
in military terms, in the Pacific region Australia resembles
a superpower. For the US, the Pacific is Australia’s
responsibility (Kerin 2004), and if Australia can’t fix even
these small island states then what use is it to the Western
alliance? The trend in the Pacific is now about security
and arresting ‘state collapse’ before it occurs. The 2003
Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands
(RAMSI) and the Enhanced Cooperation Program
(ECP) between Australia and Papua New Guinea (PNG)
are part of this new trend. They are both interventions
— RAMSI at least looked like one— but while the ECP
has been lumped in with aid, the reality is far more
intrusive.
Australia and PNG: the political context
The Australia-PNG relationship is complex. Despite the
asymmetry of power, the contest is rarely one-sided.
Australia has had a long history of involvement in PNG
affairs, much of it from a position o f formal political
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control.1After almost eighty years of colonial rule Papua
New Guinea became self-governing in 1973 and
independent on 16 September 1975. Since then, relations
between PNG and Australia have been close, but
sometimes problematic. As the incident involving PNG
Prime Minister Sir Michael Somare’s forced shoe
removal at Brisbane Airport in March 2005 (Mathieson
2005) has shown, the relationship can be testy at times.
The appearance of how things are done matters as much
as what is actually done.
While aid after independence initially took the form
of cash grants, by the late 1980s the economic thinking
on aid had shifted to the point that conditionality was
introduced to the aid budget from 1989 onwards. From
then on, tied aid became the norm as the money stopped
flowing into the budget but started to support specific
projects. The tied aid arrangement was thought by both
sides to be beneficial as it would encourage sustainable
spending by PNG administrations, but the danger of
linking aid to Australia’s interests was clear (Fry 1997,
302) and accusations of neo-colonialism have dogged
many subsequent Australian initiatives. AusAID’s gradual
adoption o f the ‘whole of government approach’
(AusAID 2005, xiii) is tied to Australia’s national security
as it aims to stabilise neighbouring countries through aid
programs that concentrate mainly on poverty reduction
through the promotion of sustainable development
The Pacific is an important part of Australia’s aid
commitment The 2005 AusAID budget totals almost
$2.5bn of which $955 million (38%) goes to the Pacific,
making it the largest portion by region, exceeding the aid
commitment to SE Asia (including Indonesia), which
accounts for 26% of all aid funds (AusAID 2005). PNG
alone receives $492 million of Australian aid. As a
developing state, PNG certainly has its share of problems
and there are few if any in PNG who would argue that
they do not need the assistance.
Despite occasional differences of opinion,
Australia has been the only country on whom PNG can
rely, and it has done so consistently since independence.
Traditionally Australia has supplied around one third of
PNG’s budgetary spending (PNG Budget 2003,10). For
PNG in particular, the point of the aid program is to avoid
this ‘fragile state’ (AusAID 2005, 22) becoming a
collapsed state. The ‘whole o f government’ approach

Social Alternatives Vol. 24 No.3, Third Quarter, 2005

Copvriflht of Full Text rests with the original copyright ow ner and, except a s permitted under the C opyright A ct 1068, copying this copyright material is prohibited without the perm ission of the ow ner or

provide law and order, how this could lead to large scale
thus incorporates Australian aid money tied to a variety
of public sector programs: governance 30%; transport
refugee flows and the possibility of transnational criqje
and infrastructure 17%; health, including programs to
taking hold. Such reports perhaps either influenced or
arrest the spread of HIV/AIDS 17%; education 14%;
reinforced government thinking and the Enhanced
Cooperation Program emerged publicly shortly after mid
and now the extra money for salaries to the personnel
2003 as an attempt to exert greater control over PNG
required for the ECP 16% (ibid).
Following the initial success of RAMSI, a more muscular
The ECP and the whole-of-govemment approach
approach was developed for the long-standing problem
have emerged following the failure of the wider neo
o f how to make PNG work more
liberal agenda, and its obsession with
efficiently. PNG is, however, a much
smaller administration and a reduced role
I f the situation in PNG
larger, more populous and a more difficult
for the state. Even the celebrated neoreally
is
as
bad
as
the
country
to ‘fix’ than the Solomon Islands.
liberal, Francis Fukuyama (2004,24-28),
has now observed the new conventional
Howard government If the situation in PNG really is as bad as
the Howard government believes, the
wisdom is that strong state institutions
believes,
then
the
ECP
ECP appears to be a very small band-aid
and the rule of law are more important
for a very big problem.
than the scope of the state’s activities.
appears to be a very
The failure of ‘Washington consensus’
small band aid for a
policies to deliver smaller but more
The Enhanced Cooperation
very big problem.
efficient government administration has
Program
led to a reappraisal of how aid can be
Australia announced the new conditions
used and for what purposes. Assistance
in giving aid to PNG in September of2003.
has become a byword for intervention in sovereign states.
Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer hailed
PNG’s problems are partly financial. Throughout
the agreement to place, at that time, two hundred federal
the 1990s, PNG experienced significant economic
police and other advisers into PNG public service ‘to
problems as a result of falling commodity prices for its
eradicate the misuse of funds, audit finances, and promote
major exports of copper, gold, petroleum, silver, forest
the efficient delivery of critical services such as health
products, coffee, cocoa, palm oil, copra, coconut oil, tea,
and education’ as a ‘new era’ o f Australia-PNG
rubber (Costello in IMF, 2001, 2-3). This led to a
relations.3 PNG’s initial acceptance was achieved with
diminished capacity to pay its own way and a consequent
a stick —agreement came after Downer threatened to
reduction in the scope and quality of state services. Regan
cut some of the $330 million per annum in programme
and May (2000,169) described the perception amongst
aid (Allard 2003).
Papua New Guineans that Australia had too much
Finally, on 11 December 2003 the governments of
influence over PNG’s government, but also observed the
Australia and Papua New Guinea agreed that the
popular feeling that the diminishing capacity of the PNG
Enhanced Cooperation Program (ECP)3would go ahead
state in the delivery of services made the prospects of
with the aims of increasing the capacity of the PNG
further Australian assistance even more likely. Australia
state to develop ‘good governance’. In February 2004,
supports PNG’s drive for the reduced debt to GDP ratio,
the first of up to 230 Australian Federal Police (AFP)
public sector ‘rightsizing’ programs and a dynamic public
officers and 64 other officials were deployed (DFAT
sector o f the agreed Medium Term Development
2004a). The problem with the ECP is not assistance from
Strategy 2005-10 (PNG Budget 2005,9-19) with its own
Australia perse, but the manner in which the new policy
Sub National Initiative that aims to support service
was so aggressively pursued. It has been consistently
delivery in the provinces (AusAID 2005,28).
touted as a ‘partnership’4but the reality is the ECP, like
This renewed focus on strengthening institutions
the non-alcoholic party drink of the 1970s, constitutes
(‘nation building’) is a corollary of the focus on security
‘the intervention you have when you’re not having an
following the attacks on the US of 11 September 2001.
intervention’.
During 2003, a number of Australian reports drew
There is a long history of Australia providing
attention to the problems of PNG governance and to the
technical assistance to the PNG public service in a wide
possibility of PNG becoming a ‘failed state’. Helen
range of matters, and it is no real surprise that just under
Hughes (2003, 1-2) argued that aid to the Pacific had to
one quarter o f the people funded by the ECP are
come with conditionality, mutual obligation and key
bureaucrats working in policy, advisory and legal
performance indicators. Susan Windybank and Mike
positions. The 64 ‘officials’ were to be deployed in a
Manning’s (2003) report Papua New Guinea on the
variety of departments, mostly in the areas of legal affairs
Brink urged a more interventionist stance in PNG in the
in non-policing roles (18 positions), finance (36 positions)
interest of Australian security.
and migration and aviation (10 positions) (DFAT 2004a).
Both drew attention to the failure of the state to
Legal officers were to be based in Port Moresby,
Social Alternatives Vol. 24 No. 3, Third Quarter, 2005
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including the position of Solicitor General, and three others
equipment, planning, training and operations but they
working in the Solicitor General’s Office. There would
would also be ‘in-line’, working alongside the Royal PNG
be five officers in the Prosecutor’s Office working as
Constabulary. Australian concerns about corruption and
litigation lawyers, two legal officers with correctional
a general crisis of law, order and governance prompted
services and four judges appointed to the national and
the introduction of police in both managerial and actual
Supreme Courts (ibid). By May 2005, only 43 Australian
policing roles. Again, the ‘thin blue line’ (White 2003)
public servants had taken up positions with eight going
seems a curious response to what has been sold as
to law and justice, 10 to border control and transport and
possible ‘state collapse’in PNG The conditions governing
25 to economic and public sector administration agencies
police deployment have now perhaps caused the entire
(AusAID 2005, 27). These officials are not only
deal to unravel.
‘advisers’. The Department of Finance covers economic
advice as well as planning and spending. Treasury was
Immunity and sovereignty
to receive at least four Australian officials to work on a
PNG is a sovereign state, and sovereign states do not
range of issues including policy advice, policy reform,
normally require foreign armed troops to help them control
investments, asset sales, wages, aid, commodity
their own country. PNG accepted the ECP as it had little
stabilization, the Structural Adjustment Package and
choice, but negotiations dragged through to June 2004
taxation policy. Department of Finance would house an
due to hostility to the notion of sovereign immunity for
official to monitor expenditure control while the
Australian personnel. A compromise emerged in June
Department of Personnel management would receive
2004 with ‘broad agreement on a revised draft’ and a
policy advice. Customs would get some assistance with
proposal to establish ‘a joint consultative committee to
capacity building.
consider cases where immunity may need to apply’ (ABC
The Department o f Planning and Rural
News 2004).
Development would receive an officer who would be
In July 2004, the PNG Parliament passed the ECP Act
the Joint Head of the Secretariat and oversee revisions
enabling the operation to go ahead and providing Assisting
to the Development Cooperation Treaty that forms the
Australian Police with immunity. The Vienna Convention
basis of the bilateral aid relationship. There would be
on Diplomatic Relations 1961 provides for immunity from
four officials deployed to the Department of Foreign
prosecution for representatives o f foreign states on
Affairs and immigration to work on immigration issues
authorised business, and the principle has also been
and two officials to give assistance to PNG’s aviation
extended to peacekeeping forces to avoid petty or
authorities (DFAT 2005a). These officers are there to
vexatious litigation that detract from the tasks at hand.
sharpen up the PNG public service, to get it organised
Sovereign immunity does not mean blanket
and efficient so it acts more swiftly to respond to
immunity from prosecution— troops and other officials
Australia’s understanding of PNG’s needs. .
are still accountable under the jurisdictions of their own
According to DFAT4Australian officials will help
states for criminal acts. Immunity for ECP personnel
PNG’s economic management by improving budget
has proved to be a vexed issue. Article 8 of die agreement
formulation and fiscal discipline; assisting with economic
of 30 June 2004 tried to set up a system where Australia
policy; establishing better performance management in
and PNG had concurrent jurisdiction for offences
the public sector; and addressing problems in the public
committed in PNG punishable under PNG law, and
service payroll’ (ibid). PNG returned its
exclusive Australianjurisdiction for matters
first surplus budget in three years in 2005,
recognised as crimes in Australia but not
...call it
due in no small measure to the increased
in PNG In cases where an act was a crime
intervention or call in PNG but not in Australia the Joint
surveillance over budgetary processes
(DFAT 2004b). Call it intervention or call
it aid, the result is
Steering Committee created to monitor the
it aid, the result is the same.
entire
ECP would decide which state would
the same.
While public sector activity is one
have jurisdiction for the alleged offence
part of the ECP, the main focus is law and
(Australian Treaty Series 2004).
order. Respect for the authority of the state is seen to be
At the time of writing, 115 of the Australian Federal
the basis o f civil society, as this apparently encourages
and State police personnel deployed to Port Moresby
freedom and commerce. Around 230 Australian Federal
and Bougainville5had been withdrawn following the 13
Police and other state police were to be stationed in a
May 2005 PNG Supreme Court ruling on certain
variety o f locations, principally in what are regarded as
provisions of the ECP agreement and the enabling Act
‘trouble spots’: Port Moresby, Bougainville, Lae, Mt
(DFAT 2005b; AAP 2005). The panel of judges chaired
Hagen, and along the Highlands Highway that links Lae
by the Chief Justice® unanimously found that sections of
to Mt Hagen.
the ECP agreement dealing with the sovereign immunity
Their functions would include providing advice on
of deployed personnel were inconsistent with the PNG
36
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constitution (Post Courier 2005a). The decision does
now wants Australia to help in creating a new prograqjme
not mean the entire ECP has to be scrapped, but it does
to assist PNG (The National 2005a). The question for
mean that at the moment Assisting Australian Police
Australia remains how to achieve what it wants in PNG
cannot enjoy immunity.
without looking like it is intervening; to date this has
The PNG Supreme Court has ruled that the Joint
proved impossible.
Steering Committee would interfere with the prosecutorial
The problem for Australia is that PNG is a
sovereign state and still has a sovereign government with
powers of the Royal Papua New Guinea constabulary,
sovereign institutions. The ECP is not a humanitarian
which are held to be sacrosanct by the country’s
Constitution, as well as with the office o f the Public
intervention and the ECP police personnel are not
Prosecutor. According to John Nonggorr (2005), who
peacekeepers. Australian assistance is welcome if it is
represented the PNG State in this case, the Supreme
offered in an appropriate way. Australia can help PNG
Court also ruled that ECP personnel could not insist on
work effectively if it pursues less abrasive methods. PNG
may be on the ropes but it can still throw a few uppercuts
immunity from claim s concerning breaches of
constitutional rights and freedoms, and this is a matter
to defend itself. If it wants effective cooperation with its
nearest neighbour, Australia needs to treat PNG as a
that effects not only the ECP deployment but potentially
sovereign state, not as a collapsed state, and to give it
all visiting diplomatic personnel.
The Australian government wants the police to
the respect it deserves.
return as soon as the legal obstacles are
Endnotes
removed. Australian Prime Minister John
The question for
1 In 1906 the Australian Commonwealth
Howard told Brisbane radio station 4BC
Australia
remains
took responsibility for the Australian
on 18 May that Australia would not budge
Territory of Papua, the former British
on the immunity issue and ‘It may well be
how to achieve
Protectorate o f New Guinea. The
that the only solution to the problem is an
what
it
wants
in
settlement of World War I permitted
amendment to the PNG constitution’
Australia to extend its rule over the former
PNG without
(Howard 2005). Australian lawyers were
German colony of New Guinea, which at
involved in drafting both the ECP
looking like it is
that
time comprised the rest of eastern half
Agreement and the ECP Act that went
intervening.
To
of the mainland of New Guinea as well as
through the PNG Parliament, and advice
from the PNG State Solicitor’s Office that date this has proved the Islands of the Bismarck Archipelago.
After the Pacific War, the New Guinea
the immunity was unconstitutional was ‘not
impossible.
section was administered as a United
considered or accepted’ (Post Courier
Nations Trust Territory and the Papua part
2005a).
as an Australian Territory.
The legal technicalities are now being
2Downer’s view is not shared by all commentators. Tim
reconsidered—Alexander Downer and PNG’s Foreign
Anderson (2003a) in a letter to The National argued
Minister Sir Rabbie Namaliu want some closure to the
this was not neo-colonialism but re-colonisation. Anderson
issue before the 30* anniversary of independence in
is also the author (2003b) of the report A Grand Deceit:
September. As Sir Rabbie noted ‘We both know that we
The World Bank’s Claims O f Good Governance In
are coming from two positions— that we obviously need
Papua New Guinea, which is highly critical of the gap
to move gradually so that we can arrive at a common
between the rhetoric of ‘good governance’ and the actual
position. But if it’s seen to be done is a spirit of
effects
of privatisation polices.
brinkmanship, then that’s where problems start’ (Post
3 Initially, the agreement was sometimes referred to by
Courier 2005c).
government and media as a ‘package’, sometimes as a
Australia would do well to heed his advice. PNG
‘program m e’ or sometimes as ‘the enhanced
may in fact need to change its constitution to allow not
agreement’. Governmental terminology has now settled
only ECP personnel but also diplomats to enjoy immunity,
on “Enhanced Cooperation Program”.
but to say so openly is to draw Australia into unproductive
4. This term ‘partnership’ was used widely by the former
quarrels with PNG over the level of Australian
Minister for Territories, Sir Paul Hasluck, in the 1950s
intervention in PNG’s national affairs. It is also indicative
and 1960s when describing the nature of Australia’s
of a failure to understand the real issue at stake with the
relationship with Papua New Guinea.
ECP is PNG’s sovereignty, not Australia’s security.
3The deployments to Mt Hagen, Lae and the Highlands
Highway had not yet taken place.
Conclusion
6There is some dispute as to the number o f judges on
PNG politicians are not actually against Australian
the panel. The National (2005 a) claims there were three.
assistance. Even the Governor of Morobe Province,
The Post Courier (2005b) cites the Head of the Institute
Luther Wenge, who took the matter to the Supreme Court,
Social Alternatives Vol. 24 No. 3, Third Quarter, 2005
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of National Affairs, Mike Manning, who said there were
fivd
References
AAP. 2005. ‘Aust police arrive home from PNG’ 17
May 2005. URL:<http://proquest.umi.com.ezpro
xy.uow.edu.au:2048/pqdweb?did=840510001 &sid=
l & F m t = 3& c l i e n t I d = 2 0 9 0 1 & R Q
T-309&VName=PQD>. Consulted 23 May 2005.
ABC News. 2004. ‘Australia and PNG reach agreement
on aid programme’, 5 June 2004. URL:<http://
www.abc.net.au/am/content/2004/sll25347.htm>
Consulted 6 June 2004.
Allard, T. 2003. ‘PNG swallows its doubt over Australian
police role’, Sydney Morning Herald, 19 September
2003.
Anderson, T. 2003a. ‘Letter to the editor’, The National,
23
Septem ber
2003.
URL:
http://
www.thenational.com.pg/0923/letter4iitm. Consulted
26 September 2003.
Anderson, T. 2003 b. A Grand Deceit: The World
Bank's Claims o f Good Governance in Papua New
Guinea, A report for the Australian Conservation
Foundation and the Centre for Environmental Law
and Community Rights. URL: http://www.devzone.org/knowledge/Pacific_Focus/
Country_specific_information/Papua_New_Guinea/
. Consulted 16 September 2004.
AusAID 2005. Australia's Overseas Aid Program
2005-06, Commonwealth of Australia. URL: http://
www.budget.gov.au/2005-06/ministerial/html/
ausaid.htm. Consulted 16 May 2005.
Australian Treaty Series 2004. Joint Agreement on
Enhanced Cooperation between Australia and
Papua New Guinea, Port Moresby 30 June 2004.
DFAT 2004a. ‘First Australians deployed in enhanced
PNG-Australia cooperation’, Statement by the
Minister fo r Foreign Affairs, Alexander Downer
12
February
2004,
URL:
http://
w w w .foreignm inister.gov.au/releases/2004/
fa022_04.htm. Consulted 21 May 2004.
DFAT 2004b. Media Release 15 December 2004,
Australia-PNG Ministerial Forum. URL: http://
w w w .foreignm inister.gov.au/releases/2004/
fal77_04.html. Consulted 24 May 2005.
DFAT. 2005a Enhanced Cooperation Program (ECP).
URL: http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/png/ecp2004.html.
Consulted 25 March 2005.
DFAT. 2005b. Transcript o f Joint Press Conference
with Papua New Guinea Foreign Minister Sir
Rabbie Namaliu, 26 May 2005. URL: http://
www.foreignminister.gov.au/transcripts/2005/
050526Joint_press_conf_png.html. Consulted 3 June
2005.
Fry, G 1997. ‘Australia and the South Pacific: The
38

R ationalist Ascendency.’ In Seeking Asian
Engagement: Australia in World Affairs 19911995, eds. J. Cotton and J. Ravenhill. Melbourne:
Oxford University Press.
Fukuyama, F. 2004. State Building: Governance and
World Order in the Twenty First Century, London,
Profile Books.
Howard, J. 2005. Transcript o f the Prime Minister the
Hon John Howard MP Interview with John Miller
and Ross Davie, Radio 4BC, Brisbane, 18 May
2005. URL: http://www.pm.gov.au/news/interviews/
Interviewl390.html. Consulted 26 May 2005.
Hughes, H. 2003. ‘Aid has failed the Pacific’. Centre
for Independent Studies Issue Analysis No. 33, 7
May 2003. URL: http://ww w .cis.org.au/
ForeignPolicy/foreignpoIicy.htm. Consulted 20 May
2004.
IMF. 2001. Statement by the Honourable Peter Costello
Treasurer of Australia to the International Monetary
and Financial Committee. Ottowa, 17 November
2001. URL: http://www.imf.oig/extemal/am/2001/0/
imfcstat/aus.htm. Consulted 30 June 2003.
Kelly, P. 2004. ‘Punching above our weight’. Policy,
Winter 2004:29-38.
Kerin, J. 2004. ‘You police the Pacific: US’. The
Australian, 5 March 2004.
Mathieson, S. 2005 ‘No Plans for Australia to apologise
to PN G ’, AAP, 7 April 2005. URL: http://
proquest.um i.com . ezproxy.uow.edu.au:2048/
p q d w e b ? i n d e x = 47 & d i d
= 834091971& S rchM ode= 3& sid= l& Fm t= 3
&VInst=PRO
D&VType=PQD&RQT=30
9&VName=PQD&TS=1121837105& clientId
=20901&aid=l. Consulted 23 May 2005.
Nonggorr, J. 2005. ‘ECP’s legal fallout on immunity’.
Post Courier, 19 May 2005. URL: http://
www.postcourier.com.pg/20050519/focus.htm.
Consulted 30 May 2005.
PNGBudget. 2003. 2003 Budget Speech delivered by
the Honourable Bart Philemon M inister fo r
Finance and Treasury, Thursday 28 November,
2002. URL: http://www.pm.gov.pg/pmsoffice/
p m s o f f i c e . n s f / 0 /
d55dfe094c949f9d88256c8000646bb0/$FILE/
BudgetSpeech%2028-l l-02.pdf. Consulted 20 May
2004.
PNGBudget. 2005. 2005 Budget Speech delivered by
the Honourable Bart Philemon M inister fo r
Finance and Treasury, Tuesday 16 November, 2004.
URL: http ://www.treasury.gov.pg/files/budget2005/
speech-2005.pdf. Consulted 25 May 2005.
Post Courier. 2005a. 20 May 2005. ‘Advice Ignored!’.
URL: http://www.postcourier.com.pg/20050520/
news01.htm. Consulted 30 May 2005.
Post Courier. 2005b. 19 May 2005. ‘Ruling Not a

Social Alternatives Vol. 24 No.3, Third Quarter, 2005

payback!’. URL: http://www.postcourier.com.pg/
20050519/news03.htm. Consulted 30 May 2005.
Post Courier, 2005c. 30 May 2005. ‘Aust, PNG want
ECP Solution by A ugust’. URL: http://
www.postcourier.com.pg/2005 05 30/news04.htm.
Consulted 30 May 2005.
Regan, A. J. and R. J. May. 2000.‘Reassessing
Australia’s Role in Papua New Guinea and the Island
Pacific.’ In The National Interest in a Global Era:
Australia in World Affairs 1996-2000, eds. J.
Cotton and J. Ravenhill. Melbourne, Oxford
University Press.
The National. 2005a, ‘ECP on Hold’, 16 May 2005.
URL: http://ww w .thenational.com .pg/0516/
nation Lhtm. Consulted 30 May 2005.
The National. 2005b ‘Wenge wants help for new
programme’, 16 May 2005. URL:http://
w w w .thenational.com .pg/0516/nation3.htm .
Consulted 30 May 2005.
White, H. 2003. ‘Thin Blue line amounts to PNG
takeover’, The Age, 24 September 2003, Opinion.

Windybank, S. and M. Manning. 2003. ‘Papua New
Guinea on the Brink. Centrefo r Independent Studies
Issue Analysis No. 30,12 March 2003. URL: http://
www.cis.org.au/ForeignPolicy/foreignpolicy.htm.
Consulted 20 May 2003.
Author
Charles Hawksley lectures in politics and international
relations at the University of Wollongong. His research
interests are varied and include empire and imperialism,
colonialism, war and peacekeeping. His recent work has
concentrated on imperialism and on the politics of
intervention in Papua New Guinea and the Pacific
Islands. This article develops a paper presented at the
First Oceanic Conference on International Studies at the
Australian National University in July 2004. The author
thanks the University of Wollongong’s Faculty of Arts
for conference support and research assistance for that
paper, and Kazuhiro Monden and David Eden for their
earlier assistance in preparation of research materials.

Postgraduate study in Education
f. T
In 2004, the School of Education is offering a number of coursework programs including:

r• ,
k r* '

■
■

■

■

Bachelor of Education (Honours)

■

Graduate Certificate m Education
- Middle Years of Schooling
- Maths
Graduate Certificate in Education
(Cybrary)
Graduate Diploma in Educational
Studies

Master of Educational Studies
with areas of study including:
— Guidance and Counselling
— Learning Support
— Middle Years of Schooling
— Multiliteracies
— Productive Pedagogies,
Learning and Assessment

■

Master of Education (Leadership)

■

Doctor of Education

As a student of the School of

-f

Education, you have the flexibility to
study full-time or part-time and
classes are scheduled at times
convenient to students who have full
time work commitments. With courses
delivered internally, externally or a
combination of both, you can design a
program of study to suit your situation
and lifestyle.

For further information:
To find out more about how Education at UQ can put you a world ahead, contact
the School of Education, phone (07) 3365-6550, email info.education@uq.edu.au
or visit www.uq.edu.au/education

fa o l T h e U n iv e r sit y
° F Q ueensland :
www.uq.edu.aLf''

AUSTRALIA

V*v~V‘‘
Social Alternatives Vol. 24 No. 3, Third Quarter, 2005

39

